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Abstract 
 
The value of networks as an integral part of the explanation of entrepreneurial success is 
widely acknowledged. It is unclear, however, in what way certain networks influence the 
success of start-up companies. The question of this paper is: ‘in what way does the 
entrepreneur’s network contribute to the success of his start-up.’ The network is important 
because it may contribute to three entrepreneurial processes, i.e. the ability of the entrepreneur 
to discover opportunities, to get resources, and to gain legitimacy. The networks of 30 ICT 
start-ups in the Netherlands were (re)constructed on the basis of in-depth interviews with the 
founders and desk research. A distinction was made between three types of initial network 
conditions. First, the more or less independent start-ups; secondly, spin-offs from established 
companies and lastly, start-ups in incubators. On the basis of the variations in the structure of 
the network and the type of relations we draw conclusions concerning the contribution of a 
particular network configuration to the ability of the start-up to survive and to grow.  
 
Acknowledgment: This study was made possible through a small grant from the 
Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) in the MES framework 
(Society & Electronic Highway, project number 014-43-609). We are deeply indebted to 
Dick Manuel for input and support of many kinds.  
 1
INTRODUCTION 
 
The formation and early growth of new firms is less spectacular, visionary and heroic than 
often thought. The field of entrepreneurship is beset with several myths (Bhidé, 2000; NCOE, 
2001), such as the delusions of risk-taking (entrepreneurs take wild risks in starting their 
companies), high-technology innovation (start-ups begin with breakthrough inventions), and 
the entrepreneur as an expert (with a strong track records and years of experience in his/her 
industry). Furthermore, one could also add the myth of the grand strategy (successful 
entrepreneurs have a well-considered business plan and have clearly developed their visionary 
ideas before taking action) and the venture capital myth (most companies are backed by 
venture capitalists providing them with millions to develop their ideas and build a business.  
 
While often the case with myths offering an inspiring account of events and stories and how 
and why they have happened (or will take place), they are not true and can easily be debunked 
(Bhidé, 2001). Most successful entrepreneurs start as relative amateurs with little background 
experience and only later, with some of the entrepreneurial and managerial lessons learned, 
they team up with (more) experienced executives. Also, initially, they are far from successful, 
often beginning with some product or service that put them on a path to something else which 
eventually will bring them success. Instead of having this grand vision and pursuing those 
radical innovations, these successful entrepreneurs all have a Master’s degree in the Bloody 
Obvious: they slightly modify someone else’s (often ordinary) ideas, execute it very well and 
take only calculated steps towards improving the product or the service in the next stage of 
their early growth. Last but not least, only a very small minority of all new firms is backed by 
venture capital (approximately one percent of them). 
 
In short, start-up firms, short of a complete set of skills and resources, typically pursue small 
and highly uncertain opportunities, that are highly new and unproven and require little capital. 
Instead of high-powered venture capitalists and customer-friendly banks, they have to rely 
upon asset parsimony and creativity in serving customers, often persuade friends and family 
to invest in them. These ‘bootstrapped entrepreneurs’ with modest funds basically help 
incubate new disruptive technologies that at first cannot compete in niche markets and 
produce revenue streams too small to attract the interest of bigger companies. Some of these 
entrepreneurial growth companies even lack a business plan from the start and only later, 
when some innovative ideas have popped up and investors have expressed their interest, 
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business plan are written and grand ambitions are expressed. Besides the lone and creative 
starters struggling to survive and searching actively for business, there are other less 
spectacular categories of nascent entrepreneurs which are kick-started in setting up shop, due 
to a supportive source (or mother) organisation or a specialised incubator. Both former 
employers and professional start-up facilitators assist the entrepreneur(s) in his (their) early 
stages by providing capital, coaching, rolling contracts, referrals to new customers, suppliers, 
hence reducing the firm’s liability of newness (Stinchcombe, 1965). New corporations 
typically lack stable relationships and sufficient resources from the beginning, but spin-offs 
and incubates, applying a don’t go it alone logic have privileged access to resources and all 
kind of strategic partnerships, due to their affiliation with their mother or incubator 
organisation (Baum et al., 2000).  
 
So the lone inventor-entrepreneur acting on his/her own behalf in the search for new 
combinations, spotting new market opportunities and striving for profit maximisation, tells only 
half of the story of (innovative) entrepreneurship. Granovetter (1995), for instance, has argued 
that economic activities are socially situated and cannot be explained by reference to 
individual motives alone; instead they depend critically on the robustness of the underlying 
social structure. Economic action usually takes place in complex social situations, where actors 
are related to each other in ongoing networks of (inter)personal and interorganisational 
relationships. Their face-to-face interactions and economic transactions are influenced by the 
larger social, political and cultural context; their pursuit of economic goals, for instance, is 
typically accompanied by that of such non-economic (i.e. socio-political) ones such as 
sociability, recognition and approval, status, and power. Like any other economic actor, also 
entrepreneurs are embedded in social networks which provide access to critical resources (e.g. 
information, capital, customers). Aldrich & Zimmer (1986) have defined entrepreneurship as 
the situational exchange of resources and opportunities, which are embedded in ongoing 
social relations. Those emergent economic linkages are channeled and facilitated or 
constrained and inhibited by the entrepreneur’s position in larger social networks.  
 
In explaining the success of a (new) company, it is therefore not only the qualities of the 
entrepreneur that play a large role, but also the social network(s) in which the entrepreneur(s) 
and his/their company is operating. A network is one of the most powerful assets that any 
individual can possess: it provides access to information, opportunities, power and to other 
networks (Uzzi, 1996; 1997). An alternative term for this whole set of active connections 
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among people and organisations, which seems to be en vogue today, is ‘social capital’ 
(Davidsson & Honig, in press). More specifically, for Cohen & Prusak (2001: 4) social capital 
includes the trust, the mutual understanding, shared values and behaviour that not only bind 
the members of interpersonal networks and communities, but also facilitate cooperative 
action. The link between the entrepreneur and his contact network and success is not 
straightforward. On the one hand, a high level of social capital (i.e. dense social networks) 
will generate positive results, contributing to more intensive knowledge sharing, lowering 
transaction costs and turnover rates and promoting greater coherence of action. On the other 
hand, social capital is not the key to organizational success, or more precise, it can be even be 
neutral or even detrimental to a firm’s success. Some organisations succeed, despite the 
negative effects of low social capital (e.g. universities, consultancies); others collapsed 
because of poor market decisions and strategic errors, despite being known for their 
collegiality and employee commitment. Or even more to the extreme, the ties that bind can 
also be the ties that blind (Cohen & Prusak 2001: 14): ‘cohesive and tightly integrated 
communities can become a problem if that makes it clannish, insular, or even corrupt.’ 
 
The core question in this research project is the following: ‘In what way does the 
entrepreneur’s network contribute to the success of the starting company.’ The network seems 
to be important when it comes to acquiring knowledge, complementary means and legitimacy. 
In the literature, however, it is unclear in what way a certain network configuration influences 
the success of a start-up company in terms of structure (dense/thin) and the type of relations 
(strong/weak). The network contribution to a starter’s success can, however, be negative as 
well (e.g. network overload). There are contingencies and the question arises what type of 
network under what circumstances will contribute positively to the success of a starter. In 
addition, it is important to gain an insight into what the causal chain from network to start-up 
success looks like. In short, ‘how exactly is that possible positive network effect brought 
about’, and ‘what are the sources of that network effect’ are two core questions we will 
address in this research. In order to answer this question, we constructed the networks of 30 
ICT start-ups in the Netherlands. Through interviews with the founders of 30 ICT/Internet-
companies and through desk research we have (re)constructed the evolving networks of all the 
start-ups in ‘mini-cases’ and have analysed them in terms of their contribution to the firm’s 
(lack of) success. A distinction was made between three types of initial network conditions. 
(1) lonesome cowboys: this category of ICT-start-ups includes companies that appear as if 
from nowhere and emerge without substantial support from partners in the ICT community; 
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(2) spin-offs/spin-outs: this second category consists of ICT-start-ups that in some way have 
been given support when they were founded from their former employer(s) (e.g. in training 
and coaching, housing, contract research, financing, etc.); and (3) incubator-driven 
companies: the third category is created, founded and built within a strategic network of 
(potential) partners and professional service providers, created as such by a specialised 
incubator. On the basis of the variations in the structure of the network and the type of 
relations we intend to develop propositions concerning the contribution of a particular 
network configuration to the ability of the start-up to survive and to grow. This study is 
intended to clarify the contingencies of the network contribution to the success of the start-up 
entrepreneur.  
 
 
NETWORKS AND ENTREPRENEURIAL PROCESSES 
 
Theoretical perspectives 
 
In the existing literature on entrepreneurship the importance of having a solid network, in 
addition to the personal qualities of the entrepreneur, is emphasized as being one of the 
factors influencing the achievement of starters. In this research we emphasize the influence of 
the entrepreneur’s network on the achievements of the starting company. The network is 
important to obtain knowledge, complementary means and legitimacy. Until the mid-1990s, 
most network studies established a simple causal relation between the size of the network and 
the success of the starter (Aldrich & Zimmer, 1986; Larson & Starr, 1993). Recently, 
however, more and more qualifications are being brought forward that indicate that the 
relation is not that simple, nor does it necessarily have to be positive. Steier & Greenwood 
(2000), for instance, introduced the term ‘network overload’. At a certain size the network no 
longer has a positive impact on the success of the starter, and may even be negative. The 
positive effect of a number of relations is cancelled by the amount of extra time needed to 
maintain new relations. To limit the danger of ‘network overload’ an entrepreneur may 
benefit from an incubator, since the incubator provides him with access to a new network. 
Another study (Stuart et al., 1999) suggests that it is not so much the size of the network as its 
quality and reputation that have a positive influence on the success of start-ups. In addition, 
various studies introduce contingencies, for example with regard to the branch in which the 
starter is operating. Research conducted by Rowley et alia (2000) shows that a network with 
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strong and close relationships has a positive effect on the achievements of starters in a stable 
industry, but a negative impact on the success of starters in a dynamic market. Research on 
‘social capital’ has yielded similar results. The analysis presented by Gargiulo & Benassis 
(1999), ominously called The dark side of social capital, shows that an existing network with 
close ties can inhibit the search for new opportunities and therefore have a negative impact on 
the success of a start-up in a dynamic market. 
 
The structure of networks may vary from a loose collection of ties to close-knit business 
groups, in which the focal organization is embedded. In this explorative study, a choice has 
been made for the effect of a particular mix of strong and weak ties in entrepreneurial 
networks, because this mix allows for an analysis of support networks in terms of both the 
depth and width of relationships. Granovetter (1995) has specified the intensity and diversity 
of relationships, i.e. the difference between strong and weak ties, on the basis of four criteria: 
namely, the frequency of contacts, the emotional intensity of the relationship, the degree of 
intimacy and reciprocal commitments between the actors involved. While weak ties provide 
access to (new) industry information and to new business contacts, strong tries are relations 
one can rely upon both in good times and in bad times. Strong ties tend to bind similar people 
in longer-term and intense relationships. Affective ties with close friends and family members 
may provide a shortcut to or even preclude the search for useful knowledge and access to 
critical resources. In other words, strong ties contribute to ‘economies of time’ (Uzzi, 1997: 
49): the ability to capitalize quickly on market opportunities. The manifestation of strong 
bonds will also reduce the time spent on monitoring and bargaining over agreements: free-
riding will be discouraged and transaction costs lowered. Strong ties are more likely to be 
useful to individuals in situations characterized by high levels of uncertainty and insecurity, 
e.g. amidst radical innovations. In such complex settings, individuals rely on close friends and 
family members for protection, uncertainty reduction and mutual learning. Krackhardt (1992: 
238) has elaborated on the affective component of strong ties by arguing that commitment, 
loyalty and friendship within an organization will be critical to an organization’s ability to 
deal with major crises. In short, a relational governance structure based on strong ties will 
promote the development of trust, the transfer of fine-grained information and tacit 
knowledge, and joint problem-solving (Uzzi, 1996; 1997; Rowley et al., 2000).  
 
Strong ties have shortcomings too. There is the risk of overembeddedness, i.e. of stifling 
economic performance (Uzzi, 1996). Close ties within and among business communities are 
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vulnerable to exogenous shocks and may insulate such commitments from information that 
exists beyond their network. There is the danger of being blind to new developments or being 
'locked-in' (Johannisson, 2000). Weak ties refer to a diverse set of persons working in 
different contexts with whom one has some business connection and infrequent or irregular 
contact. These loose and non-affective contacts increase diversity and may provide access to 
various sources of new information and offer opportunities to meet new people. Weak ties 
represent local bridges to disparate segments of the social network that are otherwise 
unconnected and may open the door to new options (Granovetter, 1995; Burt, 1992). In short, 
both strong and weak ties are useful and contribute to the emergence and growth of firms, 
although they are beneficial in different ways and at different stages of a company’s 
development (Elfring & Hulsink, in press). Therefore, the ideal entrepreneurial network 
includes a particular mix of strong and weak relationships (Uzzi 1996; 1997). We have 
distinguished three entrepreneurial processes, the ability to discover opportunities, the ability 
to secure resources, and the ability to gain legitimacy, in which network ties play a role. 
 
In order to understand the causal mechanisms between start-up activity, the relevant network 
structure and performance, we will focus on the mix of weak and strong ties, each of them 
contributing in a particular way to the entrepreneurial process. Strong ties are associated with 
the exchange of fine-grained information and tacit knowledge, trust-based governance, and 
resource cooptation (Rowley et al., 2000). Their advantages are different from the benefits 
generated by weak ties. Weak ties are beneficial as they provide access to novel information 
as they offer linkages to divergent regimes of the network (Burt, 1992). As strong and weak 
ties each have qualities, that are advantageous for different purposes we focus on the mix. 
Thereby we build on the work of Uzzi (1996) and Rowley et al. (2000) who conclude that a 
key issue in the determination of network benefits is the search for the optimal mix of strong 
and weak ties.  
 
Three entrepreneurial processes 
 
In short, both strong and weak ties are useful and contribute to the emergence and growth of 
firms, although they are beneficial in different ways and at different stages of a company’s 
development. Therefore, the ideal entrepreneurial network includes a particular mix of strong 
and weak relationships (Uzzi 1996). We have distinguished three entrepreneurial processes in 
which network ties play a role. (1) The ability to discover opportunities: an important source 
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of new ideas and lucrative opportunities may be the networks, in which the entrepreneur is 
more or less actively participating. Hills, Lumpkin and Singh (1997) found that about 50 
percent of entrepreneurs identified ideas for new ventures through their social network. In 
addition, in the process from idea to the actual start of a venture, prior knowledge (Shane, 
2000) and information (Fiet, 1996) are important. Both variables are closely linked to 
networks, as network relations can be seen as ways to gain access to knowledge and 
information. (2) The ability to secure resources: providing access to resources is an important 
contribution of networks to the venturing process. Entrepreneurs rarely possess all the 
resources required to seize an opportunity. One of the crucial tasks in a new venture is to 
access, mobilize and deploy resources. This is a difficult task in the initial stages of a start-up 
with limited financial resources and hardly any ability to generate internal resources and 
revenues. Close social support networks (e.g. spouse, family ties) may provide the 
founder/owner with the resources (e.g. financial and human capital) he or she is lacking, and 
hence provide stability to the new firm in its early stages. Additionally, sparse networks 
facilitate the search for critical asset providers (e.g. investment and technology partners and 
key customers), who may offer the start-up further access to new resources. And (3) the 
ability to gain legitimacy: a network of a start-up may be helpful as it  opens possibilities to 
gain legitimacy. Gaining legitimacy is imperative in starting something that is considered 
innovative (DiMaggio, 1992). Start-ups are confronted with the liability of newness, or simply 
stated, young organizations face higher risks of failure than old ones. Network ties may result 
in getting associated with respected players in the field. 
 
Opportunities 
 
An important source of new ideas and lucrative opportunities may be the networks, in which 
the entrepreneur is more or less actively participating. Hills, Lumpkin and Singh (1997) found 
that about 50 percent of entrepreneurs identified ideas for new ventures through their social 
network. In addition, in the process from idea to the actual start of a venture, prior knowledge 
(Shane, 2000) and information (Fiet, 1996) are important. According to Fiet (1996: 429): ‘use 
of network may be viewed as a way of tapping into an information channel to obtain risk-
reducing signals about a venture opportunity.’ Both variables are closely linked to networks, 
as network relations can be seen as ways to gain access to knowledge and information. In one 
of the first studies on this aspect, Birley (1985) carefully documented how often entrepreneurs 
seek advice and feedback on the core ideas of their business plan, when they turn to friends 
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and family for local issues, and when they use formal ties to look for financial support. The 
start-up was seen as an iterative process in which the number of informal and formal ties 
affected the success of the entrepreneur in finding a lucrative opportunity. The environment 
and the opportunities it contains are diverse and uncertain. The network of an entrepreneur is 
a source of information helping the entrepreneur to locate and evaluate opportunities. 
Networks and in particular weak ties provide access regarding a diverse set of topics, ranging 
from potential markets for goods and services to innovations and promising new business 
practices. Weak ties are supposed to lead to a more varied set of information and resources 
than strong ties can (Bloodgood et al., 1995), and consequently weak ties enhance the ability 
of entrepreneurs to spot opportunities.  
 
Resources 
 
Providing access to resources is an important contribution of networks to the venturing 
process. Entrepreneurs rarely possess all the resources required to seize an opportunity. One 
of the crucial tasks in a new venture is to access, mobilize and deploy resources (Garnsey, 
1998). This is a difficult task in the initial stages of a start-up with limited financial resources 
and hardly any ability to generate internal resources and revenues. Close social support 
networks (e.g. spouse, family ties) may provide the founder/owner with the resources (e.g. 
financial and human capital) he or she is lacking, and hence provide stability to the new firm 
in its early stages (Brüderl & Preisendörfer 1998). Additionally, sparse networks facilitate the 
search for critical asset providers (e.g. investment and technology partners and key 
customers), who may offer the start-up further access to financial resources, production know-
how and complementary technology, distribution channels, etc. Furthermore, there is initial 
uncertainty about the growth of the venture and the resources it requires (Chrisman, 
Bauerschmidt & Hofer, 1998). In the case of staged investing by venture capitalists in 
technology start-ups, the amount of uncertainty about a venture declines as it survives and 
grows. One of the key survival strategies is 'asset parsimony' (Hambrick & MacMillan, 1984). 
The required resources need to be secured at minimum cost. Paying the market price for 
resources, such as labor, materials, advice and commitment is often too expensive. Social 
transactions through network ties play a critical role in the acquisition of venture resources. 
These resources can be acquired far below the market price, the entrepreneurs (as well as 
intrapreneurs) employ social assets such as friendship, trust, and obligation (Starr & 
MacMillan, 1990). In particular, network members representing strong ties are more 
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motivated to help the entrepreneur than those with whom the entrepreneur has weak ties. 
Potential entrepreneurs assess their ability to get hold of the required resources at relatively 
low cost on the basis of their strong ties.  
 
Legitimacy 
 
The third contribution of a network to the success of a start-up is the way it opens possibilities 
to gain legitimacy. Gaining legitimacy is imperative in starting something that is considered 
innovative (DiMaggio, 1992). Stinchcombe (1965: 148-150) has introduced the concept of the 
liability of newness, or simply stated, young organizations face higher risks of failure than old 
ones. Established organizations have a set of institutionalized roles and tasks, stable customer 
ties, experienced constituents, a surplus of capital and creativity (slack), and a shared 
normative framework at their disposal, all of which contribute to an effective provision of 
goods and services and their ultimate survival. New firms and novel organizational forms, on 
the other hand, are more likely to fail just because they still have to develop and acquire those 
prerequisites (Baum, et al., 2000). Faced with the aforementioned ‘liability of newness’, a 
new venture has to organize institutional support and legitimacy. This appears to apply 
especially to (relatively) radical innovations, where young technology companies need the 
endorsement of (some of) the prominent players in their industry (Stuart et al., 1999). In order 
to enhance their visibility and gain recognition, new ventures seek to obtain a prestigious 
business affiliate to build up a strong link with and eventually hope that, through this key 
contact, they will have access to new customers and partners. Furthermore, biotechnology 
companies in particular establish large supervisory boards with well-know industry experts 
and academics (Elfring & Hulsink, in press).  
 
Suchman (1995: 574) has defined legitimacy in a broad sense as ‘a generalised perception or 
assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some 
socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions.’ Aldrich and Fiol 
(1994) draw a distinction between cognitive and socio-political legitimacy. Understanding the 
nature of the new venture is referred to as cognitive legitimacy. It has to do with the spread of 
knowledge regarding the new business concept. To overcome this legitimacy barrier, network 
actors, such as competitors, distributors and universities, must be mobilized to create 
partnerships in order to achieve a wider understanding of the new concepts. The second, and 
related, type of legitimacy is labeled socio-political legitimacy and refers to the extent to 
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which key stakeholders accept the new venture as appropriate and conforming to accepted 
rules and standards. Achieving socio-political legitimacy is particularly difficult when the 
new venture is very innovative and challenges existing industry boundaries. In those cases 
changes in the institutional framework are often required. Organizing socio-political 
legitimacy requires collective action, negotiations with other industrial constituents and joint 
marketing and lobbying efforts. 
 
Networks and corporate evolution 
 
In order to understand the causal mechanisms between the network structure and 
performance, we will focus on the mix of weak and strong ties, each of them contributing in a 
particular way to the entrepreneurial process. Strong ties are associated with the exchange of 
fine-grained information and tacit knowledge, trust-based governance, and resource 
cooptation (Krackhardt, 1992; Rowley et al., 2000). Their advantages are different from the 
benefits generated by weak ties. Weak ties are beneficial as they provide access to novel 
information as they offer linkages to divergent regimes of the network (Granovetter, 1995; 
Burt, 1992). As strong and weak ties each have qualities, that are advantageous for different 
purposes we focus on the mix. Thereby we build on the work of Uzzi (1996; 1997), Hite & 
Hesterly (2001) and Rowley et alia (2000) who conclude that a key issue in the determination 
of network benefits is the search for the optimal mix of strong and weak ties. A number of 
researchers have utilized a contingency approach to reconcile the different network benefits. 
For example, the industry context has been introduced as a contingency factor by Rowley et 
alia (2000) and Hite & Hesterly (2001), show that as ventures progress from emergence to 
growth the evolving resource needs require a shift in network structure.  
 
On basis of a review of the literature, Hite and Hesterly (2001) propose that start-ups rely in 
the emerging phase primarily on their strong ties. And only later in the early growth stage 
they expand their network to include weak ties as well. The argument for the dependence on 
strong ties has to do with the high level of uncertainty of the new venture. Strong ties are 
willing to provide the resources despite the uncertainty, while weak ties tend not to take the 
risk associated with the uncertain future of the start-up. Furthermore, in the early growth 
phase, it is necessary to develop a more diverse network in which weak ties may appear to be 
crucial to discover structural holes (Burt, 1992). These structural holes are important  to get 
access to new resource providers in order to fuel further growth. Thus they propose that 
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network benefits develop from exploitation of strong ties to the exploration of weak ties, 
while we find evidence that it is exactly the reverse; from exploration of weak ties in the 
search for opportunities to exploitation of emerging strong ties. 
 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
The research project contributes to the phenomenon of the ‘networking entrepreneurs’ in our 
Internet- and ICT-based society and to the institutionalisation of ‘networking’ in our network 
economy. There are a number of processes that indicate that ‘networking’, defined as the 
exchange of information and contacts and the wheeling and dealing between entrepreneurs, 
business partners and service providers, is not only on the rise in terms of its popularity, but 
also in terms of quality. Statements such as ‘without a good support network innovative 
entrepreneurs are nowhere’ are an indication of the social and economic value attached to 
existing and new contacts and partners within a strategic network. In addition to the well-
established technology transfer offices, large companies, universities and research 
establishments, and intermediary investors and service providers have set up so-called 
‘incubators’ to nurture new ideas, entrepreneurs and/or dynamic firms or to speed up product 
and service innovation and entrepreneurial growth in a controlled environment. where 
resources, services and contacts are easily accessible (Smilor & Gill, 1986; Richards, 2002). 
However, within the community of high-technology and ICT-starters there are also new 
rituals and innovative institutions, aimed at bringing together new ideas and entrepreneurial 
professionals that not yet know one another. In addition to the afore-mentioned ‘incubators’, 
there are also ‘virtual incubators’, such as Garage.com and Factory Zoo, that are trying to 
exchange contacts and business plans and establish global companies over the Internet. Also, 
the regular partner evenings and ICT-parties (First Tuesday etc.) and the rise of special media 
focused on information exchange and networking (e.g. bulletin boards/websites exclusively 
for starters, new magazines created by and for ICT-starters such as Red Herring and Tornado 
Insider) can be seen as illustrations of ‘entrepreneurial networking’. A very significant 
question in this context is, however, whether these networking activities, facilitated in part by 
ICT and communicated through Internet, do contribute to the success of that new company. 
 
This study is about nascent and actual entrepreneurship in the Dutch Information and 
Communication Technology (ICT) sector and especially the role that is played by the 
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networks in which starters do or do not participate with regards to the innovativeness and 
success of these ICT-companies. The population of experts and professionals that are working 
at large companies or research institutes, recent university or polytechnic graduates, and other 
specialists in a particular domain (e.g ICT) produces nascent entrepreneurs (Van Gelderen et 
al. 2000). Nascent entrepreneurs are people that are seriously considering starting an ICT-
company, whether on their own or with others. In the process of founding and building a 
company the social and strategic network in which the starter operates or wants to operate 
(with the partners and means that the company presently lacks) can play a determining role in 
the growth and eventual success of the company. This research is concerned with the ones 
that actually did so, in other words young, small and innovative ICT-companies. These we 
define as companies with a minimum of 2 employees that offer ICT-products or services and 
were founded between 1990 and 2000. Our research focuses on the entrepreneur and his/her 
network of various contacts and links. Furthermore, our sample of young and dynamic ICT-
companies includes a ‘mere’ 30 start-ups and their linkages with relevant investors, business-
partners, customers, other entrepreneurs etc. It is, of course, also possible that the company 
does not value growth and expansion that much, being relatively content with the market 
niche within which it is operating. 
 
An application of the theory and practice of the ‘networking entrepreneur’ was found in the 
Dutch ICT industry. We constructed the networks of 30 ICT start-ups which were set up 
between 1990 and 2000. We interviewed the founders of 30 ICT/Internet-companies and 
through desk research we have sought to determine to what extent the presence or absence of 
such support networks have contributed in a positive way to the success of the start-up (e.g. 
survival, growth and/or profit). In that way we reconstruct the networks of all start-ups in 
‘mini-cases’ and analyse them on the basis of development phases (conceptualisation, 
foundation, growth, etc.). We have divided the 30 companies into 3 groups of about 10 
companies each, based on the extent to which these starting companies utilise a strategic 
network to start and build their ICT-company:  
 
(i)  the first category of ICT-start-ups, called the lonesome cowboys, includes companies that 
appear as if from nowhere and develop further without substantial support from a strategic 
network. These are ICT-starters that are being founded within a constellation similar to 
traditional companies: the entrepreneur or entrepreneurial team initially sets out without 
network partners and at a later development stage may look for additional knowledge, 
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employees, funds and customer input (next to the conventional commercial and labour 
relations the company maintains with its customers and employees). Examples of lonesome 
cowboys are Annie Connect (call centre), Euronet (internet service provider), and Ring 
Rosa! (computer-telephony integrator). 
(ii) the second category of spin-offs and spin-outs consists of ICT-start-ups that in some way 
have been given support when they were founded from their former employer(s) (e.g. in 
training and coaching, housing, contract research, financing, etc.) Whereas in the case of a 
spin-off company there is no longer a direct financial relation with the company the 
entrepreneur has worked for, in the case of a spin-out there does exist a relation with the 
mother company, for instance in the form of a strategic participation in and/or 
collaboration with the nascent company. An example of a company that keeps sending new 
companies into the world is the national research laboratory CWI (Centre for Mathematics 
and Information Science), which since the early 1990s has created around 10 spin-offs, an 
example is Oratrix. Universities and large companies, consciously or unconsciously, can 
also serve as incubator for innovative ideas and potential entrepreneurs and generate spin-
offs and/or spin-outs; examples are HuQ Speech Technologies (Universityof Groningen) 
and Carp Technologies (University of Twente). Also established companies can churn out 
teams of employees that start for themselves seeking to commercialise the technologies 
they were working on previously. Examples of corporate spin-offs in our sample are 
Wellance (spin-off from KPN/Planet Internet) and Profuse (spin-off from Baan Company). 
(iii) the third category, that of incubator-driven ICT-companies, is created, founded and built 
within a strategic network of (potential) partners and professional service providers, 
created as such by a specialised incubator (e.g. Twinning). Thanks to this closely 
integrated and varied network or with the help of a strategic partner creating a virtual 
network, the start-up can develop further. Examples of incubators in the Netherlands are 
Twinning, Silicon Polder Fund, Gorilla Park and Newconomy. These incubators provide 
the ICT-start-up (in exchange for a share in the new company) with easier access to a 
number of important services, such as financing, housing and equipment/infrastructure, 
counselling & coaching, and information exchange & networking (contacts and referrals to 
clients, partners, suppliers, research institutions, etc.). Examples of such incubator-driven 
ICT-starters are Hot Orange, Trylian, and Gopher publishers. 
 
Each of the 3 groups will include at least 2 companies that were unsuccessful and that have 
faced bankruptcy. Although it is relatively hard to obtain the cooperation of entrepreneurs 
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who did not succeed, their findings are of great importance to our research. On the basis of the 
variations in the structure of the network and the type of relations they rely upon and/or they 
develop over time, we intend to develop propositions concerning the contribution of a 
particular network configuration to the three entrepreneurial processes, i.e. the ability of the 
start-up to discover opportunities, to get resources and to gain legitimacy. Thus, our empirical 
material can be summarized in a three by three matrix, three types of start-ups and three 
entrepreneurial processes. 
 
The research was explorative in nature and is aimed at generating hypotheses with regard to 
the influence of networks on the success of ICT-starters. Thirty entrepreneurs were non-
randomly selected from the databases of the Business Information Centre (BIC) at Erasmus 
University Rotterdam, EIM, and Dutch trade magazines (Automatiserings Gids, Computable, 
Emerce). In total, 31 founder-entrepreneurs were interviewed (29 individually and one joint 
interview with the two original founders). 12 lonesome cowboys were selected for the study, 
10 spin-offs and 10 incubatees (see table 1 below). The interviews were semi-structured and 
lasted on average between 1 and 1½ hour. The in-depth interviews were taped and transcripts 
were made of them. On the basis of these transcripts and publicly available company profiles 
(obtained through desk research), 32 ‘mini-cases’ of the entrepreneur and their firms were 
made. In the final phase the mini-cases will be analysed and the findings will be discussed. 
Table 1: Overview of ICT companies participating in the study 
Lonesome cowboys Spin-offs Incubatees 
 
Annie Connect Bitmagic Bibit 
Co-makers Carp Technologies CareerFever 
Euronet HuQ Speech Technologies FactoryZoo 
Keekaboo InterXion Gopher 
Metrixlab Profuse Hot Orange 
Nedstat Proloq Information Innovation 
Planet Internet Tornado Insider Oratrix 
Rits Telecom Tridion Punt Edu 
Ring Wellance Siennax 
The Vision Web Xpertbuyer Tryllian 
Vocognition   
XOIP   
 
RESULTS 
 
Lonesome cowboys 
 
Lonesome cowboys start without a particular network within the ICT industry. They are 
relative outsiders and they benefit from some of their strong ties linked to their background. 
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These strong ties are in some cases family and friendship ties, but they also profit from 
relationships in their previous work environments. However, these strong ties appear to be 
relatively unimportant. The dominant networking activity is the exploration of weak ties. 
Most of the founders in this category of start-ups discover opportunities through their weak 
ties. Experienced (e.g. Nedstat) and unexperienced (e.g. Metrixlab) founders invested 
substantial time in meeting new people, going to conferences and participating in novel 
networking type of activities (see also table 2). Although some spin-off starters disqualified 
those network events (‘those meetings are for persons without a good network’), lone starter 
Metrixlab, for instance, benefited from the First Tuesday meetings and valued them in their 
search for valuable contacts.  
 
Table 2: Mix of weak and strong ties of lonesome cowboys to discover opportunities 
 Weak ties Strong ties  Comments 
Annie Connect Diverse contacts through previous job in 
media sector 
In medical insurance related 
to WAO 
Weak ties dominant and 
substantial change in business 
plan 
Co-makers Diverse contacts through previous jobs 
and via internet 
Two family ties Weak ties dominant and one 
turned into strong one 
Euronet Diverse contacts through education and 
old jobs and crucial accidental tie 
One family member and old 
friend 
Weak ties dominant and 
accidental meeting turned into 
strong tie 
Keekaboo Contacts through friend and accidental 
encounter 
Co-founder introduced by 
friend 
Co-founder has quitted soon 
Metrixlab Many trial-and-error contacts, i.e. 
through first Tuesday meetings and 
friends of friends 
Trusted feedback by niece Frantic search for ideas and 
feedback of this student start-
up, person met at first 
Tuesday meeting turned into 
strong tie 
Nedstat Contacts through internet, searching for 
complementary information 
- Change of business plan and 
name 
Planet Internet Different people at university, professors 
and guestspeakers in class 
- Relatively early on heavily 
influenced by KPN as financier
Ring Professor AI important for research  IT friend at Nortel and friend 
in Basel 
Strong ties appear to be 
dominant of this serial 
entrepreneur in related field 
Rits Telecom Contacts through study project at 
Telecom Association and work on 
business plan writer at investment 
company 
- Early on weak tie turned into 
strong one 
Vocognition Outsiders who contacted them and 
appeared to be important for idea 
building 
- Substantial change in 
business plan 
Xoip Contacts at conferences - Frantic search for ideas and 
feedback, they wrote 20 
business plans 
 
In most cases the business model of the start-up changed during the period of emergence. 
These changes were often inspired by discussion with acquaintances, such as people they 
recently met or persons they were referred to by relatively ‘distant’ friends. The networking 
could be characterized by the frantic search for people who could give information on new 
opportunities and the feasibility of the already spotted opportunities. The uncertainty about 
the tasks and strategy of these start-ups is extremely high and they were continuously looking 
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persons who could provide information about the feasibility of their business model. The rate 
of new weak ties added to their network appears to be high, but at the same time these ties are 
dropped as soon as they realize that these persons are not able to give new insights. The rate 
of bridge decay (Burt, 2001) is very high. At the same time some of these weak ties developed 
into strong ties during the start-up phase. The role of strong ties, although limited in number, 
was to give ‘trusted’ feedback on the various stages of the business plan (often close friends 
and family relationships). These strong ties were often outsiders to the ICT community, while 
the weak ties consisted mostly of insiders. These weak ties appear to be used to get access to 
the strategic network of ICT and related firms in the Netherlands. 
 
Table 3:  Mix of weak and strong ties of lonesome cowboys to secure resources 
 Weak ties Strong ties  Comments 
Annie Connect Search for technology Accountant linked to vc. Member of 
board. First client from old media 
network 
Mix with emphasis on strong
Co-makers Project student through professor 
at TUE 
Family for money and students from 
GEM class for employees and expert 
team 
Mix with emphasis on 
strong.  
Euronet Bankmanager approved second 
round of capital 
First round of capital by landlord Mix  
Keekaboo Connection to person who had 
access to cheap programmers in 
Budapest 
For venture capital two 
‘dispuutsgenoten’ played role 
Mix with emphasis on strong
Metrixlab Advisor to make business plan. 
Trial-and-error to get vc. 
Employees through ties at university. 
Role of board member 
Mix with emphasis on weak 
Nedstat First client and Informal investor. 
Time for associations and 
network meetings 
Family and friends for first employees. 
Informal investor links to technology 
and vc’s. 
 
Planet Internet Some employees through 
consultancies  
Capital, technology and some 
employees at kpn 
 
Ring Technology through people met 
at conferences. Employees. 
Venture capital through previous 
colleagues 
Mix with emphasis on weak 
Rits Telecom Diverse contacts for search for 
more capital. 
Hennie (investment group)  for 
technology and employees. Student 
friends for employees 
Mix with emphasis on 
strong, not much uncertainty 
on direction and needs 
Vocognition Links to voice technology Friends from Nijenrode important for 
capital and suppliers. Board member. 
Mix with emphasis on strong
Xoip Supplier met at dedicated 
conference 
Venture capital and first ten 
employees through friends 
Strong ties appear to be 
dominant, stressed 
importance of building 
relations over time 
 
Some of the weak ties during the opportunity discovery process developed into trusted ties, of 
which some appear to play an important role in the process of securing resources. For 
example, at Metrixlab a tie from a First Tuesday meeting became board member and 
connected them capital and technology resources. Similarly, founder of Co-makers developed 
some strong ties in their GEM class, which connected him valuable knowledge sources. 
However, despite the role of these ‘new’ strong ties, the older strong ties, people they know 
well from their previous activities, appear to be of more importance to get hold of the required 
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resources. Previous work experience and ties developed at university have been very 
important to get access to capital and human resources. On the basis of this limited number of 
cases we find a mix of strong and weak ties contributing to the resource acquisition process. 
Although the strong ties are in most cases dominant. Some weak ties developed into strong 
ties and simultaneously some weak ties were dropped because they did not provide sufficient 
value in the struggle for resources. This selection among weak ties is a process which appears 
to be less intense in the resource acquisition process than in the opportunity discovery 
process. Thus, the wild exploration of network ties in the search for opportunities evolves into 
a combination of exploration and exploitation of the network in the process of getting 
resources. 
 
Concerning the third entrepreneurial process of gaining legitimacy, the network benefits could 
be characterized by a mix of strong and weak ties (see table 4). Although weak ties tend to be 
dominant, some also used their strong ties purposefully to get connected to reputable parties. 
Although some of these strong ties were part of their original weak tie connections and have 
developed into strong ties by the time legitimacy was crucial. So only very few ‘old’ strong 
ties were involved in legitimacy building. It was interesting to see that almost all of these 
entrepreneurs were aware of the importance of legitimacy. However, only about half of them 
were actively searching for persons or organizations to be associated with in order to gain 
legitimacy. These founders were also very keen on their public relations and were personally 
involved in the management of external communications, which was also used to signal their 
ties to partners with reputation in the field. For the start-ups without this active management 
of expectations, association with a well-known player in the field was always recognized ex 
post as being important for the growth and survival of their start-up. In these cases this 
legitimacy effect may be seen as a side-effect of their search for resources and first major 
clients. Most of their emphasis was on finding a respectable ‘launching’ customer, but 
connections to leading venture capitalists or major ICT companies, such as KPN or IBM were 
valued as well for their impact on legitimacy. 
 
Table 4: Mix of weak and strong ties of lonesome cowboys to gain legitimacy  
 Weak ties Strong ties  Comments 
Annie Connect Paid journalists to get access to 
policy makers, with whom to be 
associated 
Connections to insurance 
people used to be associated 
with well-known politicians 
Actively using ties to gain 
legitimacy 
Co-makers Recognized that tie to Metaalunie 
(employer association) was 
important 
- No purposeful search to be 
associated with ‘legitimate’ 
partners, part of search for 
clients and capital 
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Euronet Partnering with Wegener (large 
publishing company) and 
populair radio dj used their name 
- No active strategy for gaining 
legitimacy, was more side-
effect of doing business 
Keekaboo Free publicity by being active 
marketer with limited budget 
- Legitimacy was side-effect of 
marketing efforts. 
Metrixlab Being associated with professor 
at university and well known 
marketing company 
Board member well known in 
internet circles  
Actively looking for well-known 
people to be associated with 
Nedstat First client (ABN-AMRO) was 
important 
 Actively involved in giving 
presentations in order to be 
connected to trusted parties 
Planet Internet  KPN as financier and 
technology provider 
Benefited from tie to KPN for 
getting employees and media 
coverage 
Ring Pieper asked as board member 
and other board member well 
known in internet circles 
Friend introced them to first 
major client, vc dealing with 
IPO 
Actively managing people to 
be associated with 
Rits Telecom ABN-AMRO as first client and 
Radio 538 as partnership 
- Actively managing legitimacy 
because concept is unknown 
Vocognition Trial and error to get first major 
client (C&A) 
- This first major client turned 
into strong tie  
Xoip Deals with well-known players in 
the field, such as Microsoft and 
KPN 
- Legitimacy as side effect of 
working with reputable players 
for their knowledge 
 
 
Spin-off entrepreneurs 
 
The spin-off entrepreneurs in our sample were kickstarted and headed off for a fast early 
growth due to the in-depth industry knowledge of the founding entrepreneurs with many years 
of experience and the resources provided by their former employer, varying between capital, 
tangible and intangible assets (easy access to patents and facilities), rolling contracts, and 
reputational benefits as a consequence of the association with the mother organisation. 
However, the status of being industry insiders and the almost direct participation in an already 
established strategic network (e.g. the Baan network with Proloq and Profuse) or an 
international research community (e.g, in the case of the academic spin-offs Carp and HuQ) 
piggybacking on the contacts and resources of the mother organisation, proved to be in a 
number of cases we investigated a blessing in disguise: while the spin-off firm had a number 
of ongoing commitments (contracts, patents/licenses) and strong ties (with a clear industry 
affiliation), it was relatively weak to develop new weak ties, and as a consequence, unable to 
break out from the complacent networks, it already has established. Just by this trained 
incapacity to pursue weak ties aggressively and cultivate a diverse network, spin-offs lack the 
drive of the lone starters to take major risks (e.g. experiment with new technologies) and to 
spot unseen opportunities (work with new customers and partners) and they may lose some of 
their initial advantages at a latter stage. This could be seen as a lock-in effect, or a path-
dependent development. 
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 Concerning the discovery of opportunities, clearly fall back on their source organization and 
their previous skills and colleagues for their pet ideas and projects they want to pursue (see 
table 4). For some spin-off entrepreneurs, their venture is a hobby, a research experiment or a 
joint endeavour, driven by their interest, curiosity or simply, to work with their peers and 
colleagues (e.g. Planet Internet, HuQ, Carp). For others, their venture is a market niche or a 
technical application yet unserved by their mother organization (e.g. Profuse, Proloq, 
Tridion); there is also a category of start-ups attempting to exploit a newly emerging market 
(with some support), such as Tornado Insider, InterXion and Wellance. 
 
Table 5: Mix of weak and strong ties of spin-off entrepreneurs to discover opportunities 
 Weak ties Strong ties  Comments 
Bitmagic Not applicable One worked for Planet Internet and 
Volkskrant;  
Erwin, Alex, Dick, all from Planet Internet 
started as a hobby 
project, technical 
experimentation; 
2nd start-up after Planet 
Internet for Frackers 
Carp 
Technologies 
Assignment at Medialab (as 
engineering student) 
Hobby projects with fellow students; 
Study/career advisor promotes starting up 
already close ties with 
their informatics 
professor 
HuQ Speech 
technologies 
 Curiosity and strong research interest with 
university professor (PhD projects) 
 
InterXion Assignment for marketing course 
(liberalisation telecom); 
Through customer shift from 
telephony to Internet/data 
exchange 
Telecoms interconnection (previous job at 
Enertel); 
Telephone exchange 
 
 
Profuse  Idea for user interface was developed at 
Baan 
 
Proloq shift from consultancy to product 
development (through customer)  
business development by 5 Baan 
renegades (opportunity in growth market) 
love/hate relationship 
with mother organisation 
Baan 
Tornado 
Insider 
Red Herring (events & magazine) Prolin previous start-up & employer for two 
founders; 
International experience with investment 
rounds 
 
Tridion Agency.com caused a strategic 
reorientation and demerger 
(separation of product & 
services) 
Key customers KLM, Wolters 
Kluwer (also used as referrals) 
External members of Product 
Advisory Board 
Website builder Twinspark as mother 
organisation 
 
Wellance International ISP clients for 
KPN/Unisource 
Acquisition plan by Datatech 
(promoting various corporate 
projects for potential clients) 
ING Bank 
Technical group Planet Internet holding 
(KPN and Unisource) 
Development of subscriber management 
system 
No acquisition but MBO 
 
Xpertbuyer  Idea developed in previous position, 
actively supported by colleague who 
became co-founder; employers wants to 
exploit it within the firm; support from father 
and husband 
Founder is very 
experienced in 
purchasing & 
procurement 
 
After the initial stages of discovering opportunities, the subsequent stages of establishing 
surviving and seeking growth, the spin-off entrepreneurs fall back on self-financing and self-
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activation, next to (some) support from their mother organization (see table 6). While most 
spin-offs remain close with their parent (as a kind of subcontractor or specialized supplier), 
hereby expressing a modest attitude towards growth (and as such do not have a major demand 
for additional resources and assets), the more ambitious spin-offs with venture capital 
involvement go for more (e.g. Tornado Insider, InterXion, Wellance and Tridion). Through a 
substantial investment and professional commitment, new skills are required, such as a more 
experienced CEO, professionalisation of the advisory board, and more money, and higher-
powered customers and new regional markets are sought. While the former category still 
enjoys the coziness of a happy family life with the parent, the latter category of firms break 
away from their source organisaton and seek to diversify their networks with new and more 
heterogeneous contacts.      
 
Table 6:  Mix of weak and strong ties of spin-off entrepreneurs to secure resources 
 Weak ties Strong ties  Comments 
Bitmagic Business angels Pieper and 
Vredegoor 
Funds from Ministry of Economic 
Affairs for development (Kredo)  
Pieper turned into strong tie 
Trusted feedback Dick as software 
engineer 
 
Carp 
technologies  
referral to mentor (through TOP 
scheme); 
through university staff contact with 
distributors; 
through former Medialab manager 
in contact with Hoojit (major 
account); 
Temporary entrepreneurial position (TOP 
scheme); 
Contract research for university & 
professor; 
Recruiting staff through university 
Facilities & office on campus  
 
HuQ Speech 
technologies 
Informal investors (through new 
faculty director) 
Regional development & 
investment companies (through 
university) 
University for staffing  
University holding (patent, know how) 
 
 
InterXion Person who set up InterXion in 
Germany (DICICS tender); 
Extending services (storage & 
maintenance) for customers; 
Cold calls for business plan support 
(PWC), Siemens (leasing 
equipment); 
Closeness to international hub 
(Amsterdam) 
informal investors (though former 
Enertel colleague) 
then other investors (Residex, Fleet 
equity, Morgan Stanley etc. 
collaboration with Jones & Lang 
Hiring former Enertel colleagues (director, 
spokesman, support people); 
Uncles for recruitment and financial 
assistance  
 
Profuse Additional banking support 
Recruiting staff from local technical 
schools 
Advertisement in orthodox 
protestant newspaper  
Self-financing; COO (friend of the founder) Official spin-off of Baan 
(still close ties with Jan 
Baan) 
Proloq  Customers and revenues through Baan 
network  
Joining of Herman vd Weerd (referral 
through co-founder Theo van Ieperen 
 
Tornado 
insider 
Financing from business angels, 
Rabobank & Cheerlab; 
Managing editor from Oracle 
(previous job contact); 
Inviting journalists from all over 
Europe for a weekend, 
Support people from Prolin/HP (graphical 
designer, technical support) 
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Printing/publishing expert 
Large international banks as 
customers/sponsors (previous 
financial network) 
Tridion Van der Boom Groep (financing) Ronald Slot (co-founder Twinspark) in 
Advisory Board and networker/recruiter for 
Tridion 
 
Wellance Investors (P3, Pythagoras) through 
ING and Planet Internet Belgium 
From Dutrch-Belgium VCs to 3i (IK) 
ING and AEX as key accounts 
Unisource (mother): cash, technology and 
contracts (no liability) 
 
Xpertbuyer Positive attitude venture capitalist  
Further financial support from 
Ministry Economic Affairs (Kredo); 
location through Yellow Pages; 
recruitment through local university 
and polytechnic 
Partnership with Extair and In 
ventures  
Self-financing, also through friends & family 
network 
 
 
In the final stage of establishing themselves in the market place, spin-off start-ups fall back on 
a number of tactics, such as a stepping-stone approach qualifying for one round of financing 
or subsidy scheme, or participating in business plan competitions and actively seeking 
publicity or joining all kind of professional and/or regional associations and affiliating 
themselves with VIPs (see table 7). The dominant logic of these spin-offs seems to vary 
between simply functionalist reasoning stressing survival and cautiously preserving the 
partnership with the mother organization (e.g, the two university and the two Baan spin-offs), 
or focusing on operational achievements, such as quality, project execution and certification, 
or straightforwardly stressing their corporate successes (several rounds of financing, 
established strategic partners, large international customers, big events etc.).  
 
Table 7: Mix of weak and strong ties of spin-off entrepreneurs to gain legitimacy  
 Weak ties Strong ties  Comments 
Bitmagic A number of VIPs (positive for wider 
recognition, negative for VCs: no 
control) 
Secretive activity leads to all kind of 
speculations 
Frackers is serial 
entrepreneur 
Carp 
technologies 
Membership of Technology circle 
Twente 
Syntens (SME support) 
Part of the Twente University spin-off 
scheme (TOP) 
Mentor (has become strong tie) 
Survival is also seen 
as a way of gaining 
legitimacy  
HuQ Speech 
technologies 
Business plan competition & prize 
Recognition by industry peers 
(Aurora test) 
Ongoing partnership with university 
professor (PhD and publications) 
Close tie with the two regional investors 
and one informal 
 
InterXion Qualification for Kredo 
creditscheme (Ministry Economic 
Affairs) 
Legal support from acquaintance 
(ghostwriter of Telecoms Act 
Several financing rounds (220m Euro) 
Experienced international CEO (IBM) 
 
Profuse KPN Telecom as customer Baan network + customers; quality  
Proloq  Baan network (no official spin-off, but 
benefits) 
Major Baan customer 
insists on reintegrating 
Proloq by Baan 
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Tornado 
Insider 
Publicity and support in 
international banking community  
Hiring media people; 
Eurodisney Eship-VC event 
 
Tridion Large visible customers (KLM, 
Ericssson) 
Contacts with business analysts 
(Medigroup, Gartner) 
Project commitment and execution make 
difference 
 
Wellance Certification (ISO, security 
standards, best practices) 
Publicity as result of 3i investment 
KPN as a learning environment (some key 
people) 
 
Xpertbuyer Schiphol Airport as customer Former employer (now customer and 
advisor) 
 
Reputation in the 
business, NEVI-
platform 
 
Incubatee entrepreneurs  
 
The category of incubatees and their networking behaviour is more difficult to put into 
perspective. First of all, the incubator organisations with whom our incubatees were affiliated 
with, were all young and inexperienced (e.g. Twinning was established in 1998; Gorilla Park, 
Small Business Link and Newconomy in 1999), and busy with establishing themselves. The 
category of incubatees is the least homogeneous of the groups of networking entrepreneurs we 
distinguish, diverging in terms of opportunity recognition, mobilising resources and gaining 
legitimacy. While some have a clearly worked out business idea right from the start (e.g. 
Bibit, Information Innovation, Punt Edu, Tryllian), others develop in close collaboration with 
their incubators more than one option or actively experiment with new organizational forms 
(Career Fever, Siennax and Hot Orange) (see table 8). There is also a difference between 
start-up entrepreneurs which desperately needed the resources and referrals offered by the 
incubators (such as the case for foreign entrepreneurs in the Netherlands or student 
entrepreneurs) and incubatees who considered the assets and support network as something 
extra which was welcome but not desperately needed (e.g. Punt Edu, Bibit, Factory Zoo, 
Oratrix) (see table 9). One could say the same for the involvement of the incubates in gaining 
legitimacy:         
 
Table 8: Mix of weak and strong ties of incubatee entrepreneur to discover opportunities 
 Weak ties Strong ties  Comments 
Bibit Many diverse contacts as interim 
manager 
Two partners in start-up are family  
Career fever Continuous change in business 
plan, travel project cancelled, friend 
of friend had idea about business 
games 
Trusted feedback by family and Wouter as 
incubator manager 
 
Factory Zoo Customers (having worked with 
Burda, Luxembourg/Astra 
Business development for former 
employers (DEC, AT&T, IBM)  
ongoing links with 
former colleagues 
Gopher Frank Zappa (role model in 
independent publishing)  
Idea arose in the dynamic interaction 
between consultant and print entrepreneur  
- printing company of co-founder 
No role for the 
incubator Twinning  
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Hot Orange Searching for role models in the 
American Internet industry: Dell, 
Monsterboard, finally e-commerce; 
Then choice for shopping portal and 
after that Amazon model (BtoC)   
Two founders have background at 
Prolin/HP; 
Friendship with investor/entrepreneur 
Jeroen Mol (Prolin & Gorilla Park) 
Hot Orange existed 
before incubator 
Gorilla Park was set up
Information 
Innovation 
Friend in Deutsche Bank organised 
a testing of the product 
Location in Twinning centre through 
contacting Amsterdam Science 
Park 
Previous jobs and positions in business 
consultancy and in finance/banking 
 
Oratrix Involvement in EU and WWW 
research networks Participation in 
McKinsey’s New venture business 
plan competition 
 
Research lab CWI as source organisation - academic/research 
spin-off (focus on 
exploration) 
Punt Edu ING as lighthouse account - presentations for Euronet as starting 
ground 
- start-up team with life partner and friend 
 
Siennax First ICT consultancy, then Il 
Campo (Intranet/ASP application); 
Association with Twinningv and 
lead to Twinning company as first 
user 
Core of BSO-Origin sales and business 
development managers; 
Internal experimentation; 
Two informal investors and mentors (BSO-
Origin) 
Early contact with 
Twinning 
Tryllian Professional background in digital 
electronics and ICT consultancy 
(BSO-Origin) 
Working at the technological frontier in ITC; 
Early employee furthers technical 
breakthrough in mobile agents; 
Idea existed before 
 
In a number of cases the incubator and the incubatee evolved together, helping each other 
wherever and when ever possible (Gorilla Park and Hot Orange); in a number of other cases, 
where resources, services and facilities were offered to the surprise of future ‘incubatees’ (e.g. 
Tryllian, Information Innovation) and opportunistically accepted (Oratrix), one could rightly 
question the added value of the incubator. Instead of offering their incubatees a Rolodex of 
business contacts instantly, the incubators had to roll out their network of services first, 
finding business partners and searching for capital and political legitimation, before they 
could actually help their start-ups. Already during the built-up of their infrastructure, they 
ambitiously and randomly started to select a large number of start-ups as incubatees, and 
promised them services, resources and contacts they could not yet fully materialise and 
deliver. Like their incubatees, the incubators themselves also lacked a track record and all 
kind of standard procedures. The supply of services, resources, facilities and contacts not only 
varied between incubators, but also within the portfolio of investments of one incubator: for 
instance, one Twinning company only marginally benefited from an early investment, and 
another firm agreed on office space, a whole set of specialised services, and two major co-
investments.  
 
Table 9:  Mix of weak and strong ties of incubatee entrepreneurs to secure resources 
 Weak ties Strong ties  Comments 
Factory Zoo Marketing (local hockey club) staffing 
(MBA-ers and legal expertise) financing 
(Twinning) co-financing (Alan Wilde) 
Co-founders (IBM colleagues) 
RABObank as strategic investor 
and leading edge customer 
(through DEC connection) 
Relationship with 
Twinning became sour 
(opportunism) 
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Gopher Additional financial means through prize 
(Silicon Polder Fund), then Twinning 
Seed & Growth fund & Paribas 
Recruitment: Temporary agencies 
Hexspoor 
Self-financing (consultancy & 
printing)  
 
Bibit First clients through cold calls, 
employees through diverse contacts 
Friend introduced founder to 
Paribas VC 
 
Career fever Students as employees, Student’s dean, 
meeting psychological testing expert; 
First Tuesday meetings 
Friends from student house on 
board, cheap housing through 
board member; 
Legal advice from board member 
 
Hot Orange Informal investors; 
Nesbic & Gorilla Park as investors (?) 
Retail and US Internet knowledge; 
Accountants are hired; 
Additional staff through temporar gencies  
Self-financing and location 
starting from home; 
Staff recruited out of Prolin/HP 
network; 
All kind of support from Gorilla 
Park (finance, location, 
managers, advisory board) 
Two start-ups learning 
from each other;   
Information 
Innovation 
Office and seed money from Twinning; 
hiring Twining investment manager; 
Then Twinning growth + BNP-Paribas; 
Accountant andf Patent lawyer (through 
Twinning) 
After growth financing Twinning 
became a strong tie 
 
Oratrix Additional financial means by informal 
investors, Dutch government (credit 
schemes) recruiting staff through 
international research network 
Professional contacts with competitors 
Real & Microsoft, customers (BBC and 
US Ministry of Defence) 
Self-financing (by founders) 
CWI: intellectual property, 
financial backing 
 
Punt Edu Newconomy (investment company) 
Intercollege The Hague (former school) 
for accommodation 
Falling back on some alumni of 
Intercollege for staffing 
Self financing 
Siennax Pilot customers such as KPN, ADZ, ABN 
Amro; 
Twinning with Prime as leading investors 
Arthur Anderson as accountant (through 
Twinning); 
  
Tryllian Attending investment events (NEBIB) 
Two informal investors (TIFAN) 
Twinning (seed + growth) and NPM 
Housing and facilities (Twinning, but also 
self-activation) 
First employee found through life 
partner (programmer) 
Resources mobilised 
and acquired 
despite/thanks to 
Twinning 
 
Some of the incubatees with proven entrepreneurial skills and an extensive industry network 
were not desperately in need of support by the incubator to seize business opportunities. 
Others, that were clearly less experienced, could find a shelter and some seed money from the 
incubator to promote their ideas and consider some market opportunities; in this case the 
incubator could not really help, since there were not any clear ties (neither weak neither 
strong) with established companies that could act as a partner or customer for the start-up. In 
the case of securing resources, most of the incubatees benefited from the services and 
facilities offered by and through the incubator, and eventually from the new weak ties they 
now had access to (although they disagreed whether the new contrats with law firms, 
consultancies, accountancies and investors were worth the money). The relatively unknown 
incubatees also could benefit from the reputation and the brand name of their well-known 
incubator, giving them quicker access to banks, investors and other service providers. When 
the incubators ended up in stormy weather in 2001-2002, the legitimacy benefits offered by 
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incubators evaporated and some incubatees went bust or had to distance themselves from the 
struggling incubator. 
 
Table 10: Mix of weak and strong ties of incubatee entrepreneurs to gain legitimacy  
 Weak ties Strong ties  Comments 
Factory Zoo - active publicity seeking plenty of 
business plans received  
Lighthouse accounts: ATOS 
Origin, Educational institutions  
Through Rabobank access to 
SMEs 
The founder’s 
professional network of 
DEC & IBM alumni 
may have proved more 
decisive for the start 
and early growth than 
incubator Twinning 
Gopher Broos van Erp prize, Gang of 8 advising 
Prime Minister (both through Vincent 
Evers) 
Twinning (Michiel Westermann) Acquired by Quote 
publisher 
Bibit Some large clients acted as references, 
professional public relations 
Venture capitalist became a 
strong tie 
 
Career fever Mobilising people and getting to know 
them through book project 
Affialiation with EUR Small 
Business Link (Wouter & Felix) 
 
Hot Orange Third-Wednesday/Network event  
Entrepreneurs as role models (Stelios, 
Branson); 
After Bertelsmann On-line, biggest on-
line store; 
Active publicity strategy 
(seminars, workshops) 
No synergy with Gorilla 
Park: one BtoC, the 
other BtoB;   
Information 
Innovation 
After turnaround into Vizigence, product 
is now ready to market 
Through Twinning (especially 
useful for foreigners) 
 
Oratrix Prize in New Venture competition 
international recognition in the field of 
standardisation and international 
specialised users 
Official CWI spin-off Relationship with 
Twinning never 
flourished (with the 
exception of seed 
money): no 
accommodation, no 
network, no coaching 
Punt Edu Relationship with ailing Newconomy 
turned sour (negative network effect) 
Relationship with Kennisnet 
(education) became close link 
- turnaround as a 
consequence of the 
ailing investment 
company (buy-back) 
Siennax Peer group of ASP-providers (US 
Internet Working, Telestore, 
Telecomputer etc.); 
Access to business analysts; 
Higher education (Network academy 
Acadoo); 
Public relations; 
Business model based on 
recurrent revenues 
 
Tryllian Presence in Silicon Valley Creativity (serial entrepreneur: 
first start-up failed) 
 
 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
While the lonesome cowboys in their early growth stages move from exploration to 
exploitation, the other two categories predominantly focus on exploitation, in the case of spin-
offs, and on exploration, in the case of incubatees. Also the development path differs between 
spin-offs and incubatees: while the first is still very close and dependent upon its source (or 
‘mother’) organisation, i.e. a strong tie, the latter’s use of contacts is less outspoken, 
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sometimes referrals and references provided by the incubators, and/or alternatively developed 
by the in-house entrepreneurs themselves. 
 
The results of the use and development of network ties of the lonesome cowboys category is 
significantly different from the network benefits to entrepreneurs as suggested by Hite and 
Hesterly (2001). In our sample of start-ups weak ties appeared to be very important in the 
emergence phase and some of them appeared not to have any difficulties concerning the 
uncertain future of the start-up. There may be two reasons for this different finding. First, in 
our cases the emergence phase is dominated by the search for the most lucrative opportunity 
and not primarily focused on securing resources, while the focus of Hite and Hesterly seems 
to be on the resource acquisition process. Secondly, our cases of high-tech start-ups differ in 
the sense that they indeed take much more time to search for the best business concept (see 
also Roberts, 1991) and thus there is more focus on opportunity discovery and that process 
benefits more from weak ties than strong ties.  In that process ties are also less committed to 
the start-up and therefore the uncertainty and the associated risk is not that important as in the 
situation of being a resource provider.  
 
The argument of Hite and Hesterly (2001) for the growing importance of weak ties as the 
venture evolves from emergence to early growth is the need to find structural holes. This use 
of the structural hole argument is a bit odd. Structural holes and the role of weak ties are 
related to the discovery of new information. Information which was unknown and not 
expected to be known. This information and thus weak ties may be of importance to spot new 
opportunities or more specifically for these start-ups to change the business concept on basis 
of this new information. This process plays in particular a role in the emergence phase. Once 
the start-up has evolved to early growth, they know what they need in terms of resources. 
Thus there is no reason to discover new information through structural holes, the search for 
resources and also legitimacy is straightforward. 
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